

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE 425 Eye Street N.W. BCIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F Washington, D.C. 20536

FILE:

Office: HELENA, MT

Date:

AUG 2 5 2003

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(b)

of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Bureau) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id*.

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director Administrative Appeals Office **DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Helena, Montana. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico. The applicant was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than 180 days and less than one year. The applicant is married to a U.S. citizen and she is the beneficiary of a petition for alien relative. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to remain in the United States with her husband and children.

The district director found that based on the evidence in the record, the applicant had failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen husband. The application was denied accordingly. See District Director Decision, dated June 27, 2001.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("Service", now known as the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Bureau") did not warn the applicant of future inadmissibility consequences when she was granted advance parole. Counsel asserts that as a result, the Service should be estopped from finding the applicant inadmissible, or in the alternative, that the Service should apply a liberal extreme hardship standard in the applicant's case. Counsel provided no information or evidence pertaining to hardship to the applicant's husband (Mr. Cervantes).

Counsel indicates that the Service warning that the applicant received stated:

Subject is traveling abroad for emergent reasons, under the purview of O.I. 212.5(c)(3). Subject may be paroled for humanitarian reasons, for one (1) year, upon application for reentry to the United States. This authorization will permit you to resume your application for adjustment of status on your return to the United States.

The AAO finds that, whether the Service advised the applicant of the consequences of a departure from the United States is not the issue in this proceeding. The clear language of the statute provides notice and is prevailing in this case.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent

part, that:

- (B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-
 - (i) In general.-Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-
 - (I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States (whether or not pursuant to section 244(e)) prior to the commencement of proceedings under section 235(b)(1) or section 240, and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal . . [is inadmissible].

• • • •

Waiver. - The Attorney General [Secretary] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) provided a list of factors it deemed to be relevant in determining whether an alien had established extreme hardship for purposes of a waiver of inadmissibility. These factors included the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

It is noted that U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held

that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and did not constitute extreme hardship. In Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit of Appeals defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The court then reemphasized that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

In support of her appeal, the applicant submitted a copy of her husband's joint tax returns for the years 1997 and 1998, as well as copies of her husband's joint mortgage and bank statements. The record contains no other evidence, information or explanation regarding hardship to the applicant's husband.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that her U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship if her waiver of inadmissibility is not granted.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.